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COURT OF APPEALS, 1962 TERM
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF WATERFRONT CormISSION ACT NOT IMPAIRED BY
AmENDMENT
Plaintiffs, the International Longshoremen's Association (ILA) and four
individual employees of the union, sought declatory judgment that section 8 of
the Waterfront Commission Act (W.C.A.) as amended,' is unconstitutional
on the grounds that it is violative of the due process clause and that its subject
matter is pre-empted by federal legislation. The original section 8 was passed in
1953 as a means of implementing a congressionally approved inter-state compact,
2
the purpose of which was the elimination of various evils on the New York
waterfront. Section 8 was aimed at ridding the waterfront of criminal influence
by prohibiting the collection or receipt of dues by any labor organization repre-
senting workers covered by the W.C.A., if an officer of the organization had
been convicted of a felony. In 1961 the Waterfront Commission, a creature of
the interstate compact, recommended to the legislature that certain amendments
to section 8 be enacted to prevent it from being circumvented through various
strategems developed by the criminal element.3 Because of jeopardy to their
mutually beneficial employment relationship, plaintiffs challenged those of the
1961 amendments which made section 8 applicable (1) to union employees, as
well as officers and agents; (2) to labor organizations which derive their
charters from organizations representing covered workers, as well those repre-
senting covered workers themselves; and (3) to conviction for certain misde-
meanors and specified crimes as well as conviction for felony.4 The trial court
granted defendant Waterfront Commission's motion for summary judgment
declaring section 8 as amended, constitutional, and dismissed the complaint.5
The Appellate Division modified by striking the dismissal and as modified,
affirmed. 6 On appeal to the Court of Appeals, held, affirmed, one Judge dissent-
ing. The amendments to section 8 of the Waterfront Commission Act, the
constitutionality of which is firmly established,7 do not alter the statute so sub-
stantially as to impair its constitutionality under either the supremacy clause of
the Constitution or the due process clause of the 14th Amendment. Bradley
1. N.Y. Unconsol. Laws §§ 9801-9937 (McKinney 1961), as amended by N.Y. Sess.
Laws 1961, ch. 211.
2. Interstate Waterfront Commission Compact, N.J.S.A. § 32:23-1-113 (1963); N.Y.
Unconsol. Laws §§ 9801-9937 (McKinney 1961); approved by Congress 67 Stat. 541
(1953).
3. See the Special Report to the Governors and Legislators of New York and New
Jersey summarized at p. 18 Respondents brief.
4. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 211.
5. 30 Misc. 2d 518, 220 N.Y.S.2d 681 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
6. 16 A.D.2d 908, 229 N.Y.S.2d 159 (1st Dep't 1962).
7. DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960); Linehan v. Waterfront Comm'n, 116
F. Supp. 683 (1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 439 (1954); Staten Island Loaders v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 117 F. Supp. 308 (1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 439 (1954); O'Rourke v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 118 F. Supp. 236 (1954); Hazelton v. Murray, 21 N.J. 115, 121 A.2d 1 (1956);
ILA v. Hogan, 3 Misc. 2d 893, 156 N.Y.S.2d 512 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
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v. Waterfront Cornm'n, 12 N.Y.2d 276, 189 N.E.2d 601, 239 N.Y.S.2d 97
(1963).
The authority of Congress to exert its legislative will in the field of labor
relations is well established as an incident of the commerce power.8 However,
the primacy of Congress in this area does not dictate the absolute exclusion of
state legislation.9 The states are permitted to exercise a wide range of powers
concurrently with the federal government, conditional upon the avoidance of
conflict.' 0 The respective distribution of power in any given area of legislation
is entirely within the power of Congress to define," while the interpretation of
Congressional declaraction is for the Supreme Court.12 Whenever it is urged
that a state statute must fall because of collision with federal policy, the Supreme
Court must decide whether the state law is so repugnant to federal enactment
that the two cannot be reconciled.' 3 The Court will make every effort to
accommodate the state and federal enactments, one to the other, so as to pre-
serve both. 14 It has been held that a state could properly regulate certain labor
union activities such as mass picketing, threats, and violence since such conduct
was not governed by the National Labor Relations Act. 1 On the other hand,
state regulation aimed at limiting employees full freedom to choose their
bargaining representatives has been struck down.' 6 An important element of
the law concerning state power over interstate commerce, and labor relations
is the doctrine of congressional consent to state action.' 7 The Supreme Court
has declared that Congress may "permit the states to regulate the Commerce in
a matter which would otherwise not be permissible" or "exclude state regulation
of matters of peculiarly local concern which nevertheless affect interstate
Commerce."'
8
State regulation of employment and prescription of qualifications for
persons seeking to engage in a trade or business have been held to the standard
of reasonableness.' 9 The due process clause of the 14th Amendment does not
8. NLRB v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49 (1937); NLRB v. Friedman-Harry
Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58 (1937); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937);
Washington, Va., Md. Coach Co. v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 142 (1937); NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
9. Weber v. Anheuser-Busch Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955); Atlantic Coastline R.R. Co.
v. Georgia, 234 U.S. 280 (1914); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1944); Allen-Bradley
Local v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd. 315 U.S. 740 (1942); Kelly v. Washington,
302 U.S. 1 (1937); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 298 (1851).
10. Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., supra note 9;
Kelly v. Washington, supra note 9.
11. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
12. Ibid.
13. Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740 (1942)
and cases cited; Missouri, K. & T.R.R. v. Harris, 234 U.S. 412 (1914); Reid v. Colorado,
187 U.S. 137 (1902).
14. See cases cited note 13 supra.
15. Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740 (1942).
16. Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
17. See Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power-Revised Version, 47 Colum.
L. Rev. 547, 552-60 (1947).
18. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
19. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners
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prohibit governmental regulation for the public welfare, but arbitrary or
unreasonable regulations will be struck down, and the claim of public interest
must be justified.20 The right to engage in a legitimate trade or business is
protected by the Constitution,2 1 but the right is not absolute.22 It is difficult
to define the exact boundaries of the state's police power, or how far it may
be used to curtail individual liberty, so each case must be carefully evaluated
in the light of the particular circumstances.
23
Plaintiffs in the instant case were faced with the formidable task of
distinguishing DeVeau v. Braisted.2 4 In that case the original section 8 was
exposed to a constitutional attack mounted on grounds almost identical to the
present claims of pre-emption and violation of due process. Despite the fact
that DeVeau seems to be exact precedent on the pre-emption issue, the tenuous
ground upon which the Supreme Court's decision is based makes it appear
vulnerable. In that case the plaintiffs contended that section 8 was in conflict
with certain provisions of the National Labor Relations Act and Labor-Manage-
ment Reporting and Disclosure Act,2 5 because it restricted, more narrowly
than the applicable federal enactment, the right of employees to bargain col-
lectively through representatives of their own choosing. In support of this
contention the plaintiffs cited Hill v. Florida6 where the court declared un-
constitutional a Florida statute2 7 limiting the freedom of workers to select union
representatives, and in doing so, made it quite clear that Congress intended to
permit no infringement of any kind on employees rights to select their own
representatives. 28 The DeVeau Court distinguished Hill on the ground that
the very important element of "Congressional approval of the heart of the state
legislative program explicitly brought to its attention, was not present in that
case."20 The Court further stated that "nor was it true of Hill v. Florida, as it
is here, that the challenged state legislation was part of a program fully canvassed
by Congress through its own investigations, to vindicate a legitimate and
compelling state interest, namely, the interest in combatting local crime in-
New Mexico, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Slochower v. Board of Higher Education of N.Y.C.;
350 U.S. 551 (1956); Traux v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915); United States v. Lovett, 328
U.S. 303 (1946); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S.
189 (1898).
20. See cases cited note 19 supra.
21. New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932); Williams v. Standard
Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929).
22. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189
(1898).
23. See, 16 CJ.S. Constitutional Law § 175(b) (1956) and cases cited.
24. 363 U.S. 144 (1960), noted in 59 Mich. L. Rev. 643 (1961), 46 Minn. L. Rev.
437 (1961).
25. National Labor Relations Act § 7, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958);
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 73 Stat. 536 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 504(a).
26. Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
27. House Bill No. 142, Laws of Florida, 1943, ch. 21968, F.S.A. § 477.04 (1952).
28. Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538, 541 (1945).
29. De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 155 (1960).
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festing a particular industry.130 Commenting on this "consent" aspect of
the DeVeau opinion Professor Paul Hays had this to say:3 1
[E]ven more interesting is the view, . . . that Congress's consent to
the interstate compact in 1953 could affect the interpretation of a
statute it had adopted in 1947. Surely congressional consent to the
compact, in accordance with article I, section 10, of the Constitution,
did not have the effect of amending the National Labor Relations Act.
Does the Court suggest, then, that subsequent congressional action,
short of the adoption of a statute is effective to put an authoritative
interpretatory gloss on previously adopted statutes? Is the intent of
Congress in 1953, in another context, relevant to the meaning of a
statute adopted in 1947? Or is the Court to be guided by what
Congress says in 1953 about the legislative intent of 1947?
In view of the critical importance of the "consent" argument, and because of
the inherent weakness thereof, the present plaintiffs urged that the 1961 amend-
ments extending the scope of the W.C.A. could not have been brought to
Congressional attention, and therefore the rule of Hill v. Florida should apply.
82
The Court of Appeals disposed of plaintiffs' contentions by pointing out that two
of the challenged amendments represented no extension of the scope of the
W.C.A., since they were enacted to prevent frustration of the original pro-
visions, a type of amendment prospectively consented to by Congress in 1953,11
and that a provision almost identical to the third amendment was part of the
New Jersey implementing actS34 at the time Congressional approval was given.85
The Court took a similar view of the plaintiffs' due process objections ruling
that DeVeau controlled since the amendments did no more than affect the
legitimate governmental objectives approved in that case.
Bradley v. Waterfront Comm'n will have little significance on the pre-
emption issue independent of DeVeau since the Court of Appeals saw no legal
distinction between the two cases. The Court foreswore the more basic grounds
for distinguishing Hill v. Florida that it had employed in its original opinion30
in the DeVeau litigation, and chose instead to accommodate the "consent"
theory of the Supreme Court, to the present circumstances. This choice was
dictated by the Supreme Court's status as final arbiter in the area of alleged
conflict between state and federal legislation.37 This leaves still unanswered
the question as to the vitality of Hill v. Florida in the wake of DeVean. Pre-
sumably, since the Supreme Court did not overrule Hill, that case will continue
to rule out state legislation limiting the right of employees to bargain collectively
30. Ibid.
31. Hays, The Supreme Court and Labor Law October Term, 1959, 60 Colum. .,
Rev. 901, 908 (1960).
32. Appellant's brief pp. 9-10.
33. Instant case at 279, 189 N.E.2d at 602, 239 N.Y.S.2d at 99.
34. N.J. Acts 1953, ch. 202 (S.A. 32: 23-1-113).
35. Instant case at 279, 189 N.E.2d at 602, 239 N.Y.S.2d at 99.
36. 5 N.Y.2d 236, 157 N.E.2d 165, 183 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1959).
37. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
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through representatives of their own choosing, in the absence of Congressional
consent. Although DeVeau might be part of a growing willingness on the part
of the federal courts to permit greater state regulation of labor unions, in the
face of growing public concern over abuses. It is the due process aspect of
Bradley that is significant, if any one is, and disturbing. The Court quotes
DeVeau for the proposition that the disqualification of convicted "felons" from
representing labor unions is a "reasonable means for achieving a legitimate state
aim." s3 8 Then the Court points out that the aim of the present amendment is
the same, elimination of corruption from the waterfront, and closes its dis-
cussion of the issue. It would appear that only the question of legitimacy of
aim is considered-not reasonableness of means. The Court ignores the fact
that justice Frankfurter, writing the opinion in DeVeau, expressed concern
over the drastic nature of the means employed therein-disqualification of
ex-felons; but was able to find support for such measures in comparable federal
legislation.3 9 The disqualifications of the present statute are even more drastic,
and the argument based on comparable federal legislation does not apply, and
yet the Court of Appeals gives the matter scant attention in the opinion. One
feels that when a court deprives a class of persons of "the right to . . . work
• . . the most precious liberty that man possesses," 40 a careful elaboration of
the court's reasoning is warranted. Of course the states have wide powers to deal
with interests basic to the well being of their people, they may set standards
and requirements for entrance or practice of any field of occupation without
elaborate review procedure. However, it is quite another thing to permit the
deprivation of a man's livelihood on grounds not related to his fitness for the
occupation involved. It is'difficult to perceive how conviction for certain misde-
meanors involving moral turpitude would be indicative of a man's fitness or
lack of it, for employment as union representative. The Court leaves this
question in doubt.
Albert Dolata
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF NEW YORK CITY MNImum WAGE LAW-A LIm-
ITATION ON MUNICIPAL HomE RULE POLICE POWERS
In 1960 the New York State Legislature enacted a state-wide minimum
wage law covering virtually all occupations.' It required an hourly minimum
of $1.00 in 1960, $1.15 in 1962, and $1.25 in 1964. For the implementation
of the law, the act provided an Industrial Commissioner and Wage Boards em-
powered to make necessary upward adjustments. In 1962, New York City
adopted a similar law requiring minimum hourly rates of $1.25 in 1962, and
38. Instant case at 280, 189 N.E.2d at 603, 239 N.Y.S.2d at 100.
39. De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960).
40. Dissenting opinion of justice Douglas in Linehan v. Waterfront Comm'r, 116 F.
Supp. 683, 684 (1953).
1. N.Y. Labor Law, §§ 550-565.
